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Mind the gap!  










This paper aims to quantify West German mothers‟ foregone earnings that stem from inter-
mittent labor market participation due to first birth. As Random Effects regression results with 
German Socio-Economic Panel Data (West) indicate, at the closure time of their fecundity 
window mothers realize gross hourly wage cuts up to 25%, compared to equally educated 
career women, whereas the total of annualized losses amounts to as far as 201,000 Euro. In 
the context of a dynamic bargaining model of household decisions, the care bill is suited to 
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1  Introduction 
 
Everybody knows that children enrich one‟s life, and – also in a lifetime perspective – cost 
plenty of money. But: the money of whom? Whereas explicit costs to be related to nurturing, 
dressing and educating are added up fairly quickly, the calculation of implicit costs, like quan-
tifying the income loss due to birth-related labor market discontinuities, is a far more chal-
lenging task. Ample theoretical research on the issue of human capital decisions in a multi-
period household model context is accompanied by a profound lack of figures in this area. 
Furthermore, there is manifold evidence that individuals‟ behavioral decisions in the house-
hold context just take account for those hidden child costs. In Western Germany, the total 
fertility rate declined between 1997 and 2008 from 1.44 to 1.37, whereas in the same time it 
continuously rose in the Eastern part of Germany from 1.04 up to 1.40 (the overall German 
rate 2008 amounted to 1.38)
2. Furthermore, the postponement of first motherhood is a rather 
West German phenomenon, and only in the Western part childlessness is positively correlated 
to mothers‟ level of education and hence their level of losses
3. As birth-related labor market 
withdrawal only emerges in case of lacking reconcilability, income losses are to be considered 
as a specialization risk of motherhood especially in the Western part of Germany. The paper 
is organized as follows: In chapter 2, the theoretical baseline of the argumentation is out-
lined. Chapter 3 deals with the empirical results on birth-related income losses. To this end, it 
first surveys the deployed data before describing the utilized econometric model as well as the 
achieved regression and simulation results. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how to in-
strument results of chapter 3 as a specialization risk and further aims to isolate three important 
determinants of its quantity. A brief conclusion completes the paper (chapter 5).  
 
2  Theoretical baseline of argumentation: The Bargaining approach 
 
The issue of family economics has got a long tradition. Gary S. Becker established with his 
model of time allocation in the household context the research area of „New Home Econom-
ics“
4. In this model, the single household acts as consumer, production, and insurance com-
munity that protects its members against various ‚vicissitudes of life„
5. Owing to economies 
of scale in the use of collective goods and comparative advantages in time use, combined with 
interpersonally  transferable  goods,  the  maximization  of  the  single  household  utility  is 
achieved by maximized specialization of household partners.
6 Pioneer work in family eco-
nomics has as well been done by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and Ofek (1982). 
For Germany, many studies on this issue have been published in the last 20 years (e. g. Hel-
berger (1984); Galler (1991); Licht and Steiner (1991a; 1991b; 1992); Beblo and Wolf (2000; 
2002; 2003); Ziefle (2004); Görlich and de Grip (2007). 
                                                 
2 See Statistisches Bundesamt (03.03.2010) 
3 See with respect to childlessness: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009).  
4 See Becker, G. (1965).  
5 See Ott, N. (1995), p. 81. The expressions ‚partnership„, ‚household„, ‚connection„ , „commitment‟, „liaison‟ 
etc. are used in this paper interchangeably, since the decisive matter of fact is the common housekeeping. 
6 Interestingly, the theory of female endowment advantage with respect to household work relies on the assump-




At least two developments forced the transition of gender roles: The educational level of fe-
males caught up with their male counterparts, and due to technical progress in household pro-
duction specialization gains diminished rapidly. At the same time, maybe as a consequence, 
divorce rates increased in most western countries, thereby creating asymmetric risks for part-
ners coping with the traditional division of labor. The decision of specialization therefore re-
sembles the classic prisoner„s dilemma: In case of cooperation (keeping the connection via-
ble) both partners benefit from specialization in terms of a higher household welfare (win-win 
situation). However, in case of dissolution as the end of cooperation, the market oriented part-
ner continues to reap the returns of his non-stop market employment career, whereas the care-
oriented partner faces an abrupt shortening of options concerning his economic prospects. 
Efficiency gains from marriage emerge particularly in the first years, when children are small 
and advantages of specialization are quite high.
7 During that time, the partner who specialized 
on household related work contributes a big share on household welfare by refraining from 
investing in his own market oriented human capital. In the cooperative scenario, this input is 
reimbursed by the market oriented partner in terms of proceeded aliments in times when adult 
children leave the family. In the non-cooperative scenario, the end of  women‟s fecundity 
span, likewise the end of non-substitutional parental care, denotes a point of risk-turnaround.    
Dynamic bargaining models like the one of Ott (1992) deal with cross-period effects of time 
allocation decisions in the framework of collective (cooperative or non-cooperative) decision 
making
8: The maximum utility of one partner that is obtainable in case of commitment break 
is as a conflict payment part of the following cooperative Nash solution:  
 = [   ]*[ ]
9                                                                              (1) 
In this specification, the parameter x denotes a vector of household goods which are produced 
at a price vector p and which are subject to the periodic bargaining activities of partners. Fur-
thermore, partners bargain for time allocation on household and market work (and, if any, 
leisure).
10   denotes the marital utility of the male,   of the female partner. The conflict 
payment (threat point) of a partner,  (p,  , equals his or her maximum single utility that is 
attainable with  as his/ her single income at current prices (p): 
(p,  , upon condition that   = x´p.                                                           (2) 
Each partner enters cooperation only if his or her utility from marriage exceeds single utility:  
( .                                                                                                   (3) 
Whereas the individual out-of-marriage utility doesn‟t matter in the unitary model as connec-
tions are stable, in order that – by definition – a shift in out-of-marriage options may not alter 
the intra-marriage distribution rule, the same shift of outside options plays a key role in the 
bargaining model: The decision to concentrate on household related time allocation today 
                                                 
7 See Becker (1976), p. 207-214. 
8 The forthcoming figures follow the model of Ott (1992); e. g. individual utilities are assumed to be interte m-
poral additive; see Ott (1995), p. 80-91 for a complete formulation of the model.  
9 The multiplicative conjunction of marital gains indicates interdependent  individual utilities and works as an 
incentive of both partners to maximize total household output. 
10 In this context, they face the common restrictions, namely a budget constraint (consumption expenditures may 




(hereafter labeled as „caring‟) induces a loss of market oriented human capital and thereby, 
via a reduced income capacity, a shortened intra-marriage bargaining power in the following 
periods. From the caring spouse‟s point of view, the deterioration of his/ her bargaining power 
may pre-dominate the overall gain in household utility via the increase in household produc-
tion. In a two-period model, as against his or her utility before specialization (in period 1), it 
might be that the caring spouse is worse off afterwards (in period 2). As a rational individual 
he or she foresees this constellation and thus, refuses to agree on the deal in period 1.  For this 
reason, in dynamic bargaining models overall household welfare comes out to be sub-optimal 
















 denotes the household production possibility frontier before specialization (before child-
birth) as the sum of utility pairs achievable with given income Y at given prices p. The house-
hold  indifference  curves  IND1  and  IND2  represent  utility  pairs  that  guarantee  a  constant 
household utility whereas the utility level of IND2 exceeds that of IND1. Before childbirth, 
point A accrues as the maximum achievable household utility that coincides with the given 
intra-marital distribution rule. From point A,   as the marital utility of the male and   of 
the female partner is derived. As can easily be seen, each partner is better off in the alliance 
than out of it, since   exceeds   and   exceeds  .  
Assumed the birth of the first child would mark up the beginning of a new period (period 2). 
Assumed further that it required a specialization of the female partner on caring, and that the 
child induced a net welfare gain of the household that is indicated by an outer-shift of the 
household production possibility frontier ( ). In this case, the pointed area in figure 1 de-
notes all Pareto-improvements that accrued from the imagined new situation. Because of the 
assumption of exogenous preferences, hence an unchanged distribution rule in the unitary 
model, point B arrives as the new tangential point of   and IND2. As the postnatal utility of 
                                                 
11 The illustrations in figures 1 and 2 follow Ott (1995), p. 90. 
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Figure 1: Household utility derived from household specialization of the female partner in the 




each partner exceeds the prenatal one (  > ;    ), both partners would be willing to 
agree on the specialization deal: The child will be born.  
Things look quite different if a stranding of the alliance is considered (see figure 2):  
Figure 2: Household utility derived from household specialization of the female partner in the dy-










Like in figure 1, marital utility levels of both partners exceed their single utility level in period 
1. Correspondingly, the birth of a child causes the household production possibility frontier to 
shift from   to  , so a higher household utility level is attainable. But, the deterioration of 
female out-of-marriage options in period 2 that accrues from her specialization-decision in 
period 1 (as indicated by a sharply reduced single utility  ) alters the intra-marital distribu-
tion rule in period 2 to the detriment of the woman (demonstrated by the shift of the slope of 
IND2). Compared to her utility level in period 1, the woman comes out to be worse off in pe-
riod 2. Whereas the male spouse is better off in a double sense (both increased earnings and 
distributional power) the female spouse will refuse to agree on the deal. The partners‟ utility 




3  The quantity of birth-related wage losses 
  
3.1  Data  
To quantify birth related income losses, respective data and panel data of the German Socio-
Economic-Panel  (GSOEP),  waves  1984-2005,  have  been  exploited.  The  German  Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) was started in 1984 and is a wide-ranging representative lon-
gitudinal study of private households, located at the German Institute for Economic Research, 

















sampled, consisting of Germans living in the Old and New German States, Foreigners, and 
recent Immigrants to Germany. The employment sample of the empirical investigation out-
lined in this paper consists of 1,610 West German women aged 16-55 with 6,276 observations 
in total. The data of East German or foreign women are excluded since their income contexts 
don‟t fit the Western German ones. The wage sample (as part of the employment sample) 
consists of 1,038 women with 3,255 observations and is furthermore restricted to dependent-
employed women who are not in education at the time of the interview.  
 
3.2  The econometric model and regression results 
 
As to the wage regression, a comprehensive set of human capital related variables has been 
implemented, endorsed by various workplace and work setting variables. As to the model 
specification, Ordinary Least-Squares-, Fixed Effects- and Random Effects-estimations have 
been employed. With respect to the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity and the fact that 
there is far more cross-sectional than longitudinal information in the underlying data set
12, the 
Random Effects specification suits the data  best.
13 The linear multiple regression  has been 
specified in the following form:
14  
ln  =   +   +     + ∑
m
j 1     +∑
n m
m j 1     +∑
k n m
n m j 1     +                             (4) 
(i=1, 2,…, N;  t=1, 2,…, T)                                         
whereat  
    = real gross hourly wage rate of person i at time t, 
    = constant (‟Grand Mean‟), 
    = unobserved individual effects,    
    = inverse of Mill‟s Ratio,    
    = set of m schooling and vocational training variables,  
    = set of n professional experience variables,  
  = set of k control variables,  
εit     = disturbance term,  
,      = parameters to be estimated. 
The real gross hourly wage rate of individual i at time t, wit, is a function of his time-variant 
level of schooling ( ), his professional experience ( and the magnitude of several 
control variables at time t ( .   denotes unobservable wage-relevant characteristics 
which are possibly correlated with the explaining variables (e. g. labor market affiliation).   
                                                 
12 (this is because  the wage information is restricted to the calendar data of waves 2001-2005) 
13 Due to the merely five-year time horizon of wage information  in association with the property of the within 
estimator to solely exploiting intrapersonal information, the Fixed Effects model failed to properly predict the 
wage impact of long-lasting employment spells. Thus, calculations based on Fixed Effects tend to overestimate 
resulting wage losses, whereas simulations based on Random Effects estimation are to be considered as conserv-
ative evaluations at the lower end of loss range. 




terms the inverse of the Mill‟s Ratio that has been gained by a Probit estimation
15, and – so as 
to control for sample selection –, imputed into the wage equation (Two-step Heckman). The 
employment equation has the following form: 
   
 =  γ +  ;  =                                                                                              (5) 
                                    
 labels a latent variable and measures the inclination of individual i at time t to be (depen-
dently) employed.   denotes an observable dichotomous variable that amounts to 1 in case 
of dependent employment and to null otherwise. Vector   consists of various reservation 
wage-relevant socio-economic variables.    denominates the disturbance term, and γ names 
the parameter vector in demand, indicating the impact of a distinct explaining variable on the 
likelihood of (dependent) employment.
16 Table 1 illustrates sample‟s descriptive statistics
17:  
________________________________________________________ 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
i  
 
Variable          Number of  Mean    Standard-   Min  Max 
(Reference in brackets; 
D=Dummy)     observations      deviation           
 
Explained variable in employment equation 
Dependently  employed
D      6276        .5188018      .4996862   0  1 
 
Explained variable in wage equation (in €)
ii 
Log of real gross hourly wage with fringe benefits   3254    2.544895     .4352205    .1945588   4.39 
Log of real gross hourly wage without fringe benefits  3254    2.480366     .4135072    .1100355   4.28 
Schooling and Vocational Training 
Low level of schooling:      6276        .3355641     .4722249     0            1 
No degree/ compulsory school
D  
(Medium level of schooling: Realschule
D)    6276        .3961122     .4891272    0  1     
Higher education entrance qualification
D    6276        .2683238     .4431223     0  1            
No vocational degree
D       6276        .2178139     .4127931    0  1    
(Medium vocational degree:      6276        .6698534     .4703032     0            1 
Apprenticeship, Professional School
D)    
University degree
D        6276        .1123327     .3158005     0            1 
                    
Professional Experience (in years) 
Tenure          6276        3.392447     5.326808    0  37 
Current full-time           6276        2.664914      5.58918    0           37    
Current non-stop full-time       6276        1.646112     4.818772    0           35 
Former full-time before time-out       6276       3.746176     4.935741    0  39        
Former full-time before part-time      6276        .8231358     3.145747    0  30 
Current  part-time             6276        1.639579     3.812555    0  34 
Former part-time            6276        1.898662     3.650848    0  25           
Time-out (current or former type)    6276       4.581899     6.280722    0           36 
Current time-out             6276        1.533461      4.32968    0  36 
Current birth-related time-out      6276        .4362651     1.479286    0  10 
                                                 
15 See for example Greene (2000), pp. 813ff.  
16 The estimated employment propensity refers solely to the domestic background, not to actual workplace co n-
ditions; neither there is an estimation of re-employment propensity being responsive to former job biography. 
17 (as some of employment sample women are not employed in the interval 2001 -2005, some job related va-




Table 1 (contd.): Descriptive Statistics
i  
 
Variable          Number of  Mean    Standard-   Min  Max 
(Reference in brackets; 
D=Dummy)                                observations                                                 deviation 
 
Former time-out               6276        3.048438     5.049133    0  32 
Unemployment (current or former type)    6276        .4141173     1.223066    0           16 
Current (registered) unemployment      6276        .0482792      .406005    0  9      
Former (registered) unemployment       6276        .3658381     1.097192    0  15             
 
Workplace and work setting related control variables 
Agriculture and forestry
D          6276    .0071702    .0843795    0  1               
Mining and energy
D        6276        .0035054     .0591074    0  1 
Construction
D        6276    .0116316     .1072294    0  1 
Trade
D          6276    .1159975     .3202474    0  1 
Transportation
D             6276    .0160931     .1258435    0  1          
Banking, insurance, other private services
D    6276        .4115679     .4921568    0            1    
(Manufacturing)        6276    .1089866     .3116473    0  1 
Civil Service
D         6276    -.4520395 1  .137591                          1            
Occupational prestige
#       6276    43.0854    37.40649                       216 
Civil servant
D         6276    .0470045    .2116653    0  1        
White collar worker
D        6276    .4507648    .4976096    0  1           
(Blue collar worker
D)       6276    .1073932    .3096372    0  1 
Firmsize 20-199 employees
D      6276       -.7267368 1  .277719                        1 
Firmsize 200-1999 employees
D        6276       -.8608987 1  .133732                       1            
Firmsize 2000 minimum
D      6276       -.8368388 1  .16201                       1 
(Firmsize 19 employees maximum)
D    6276    -.9063098 1  .076878                       1 
Weekly working hours
##          6276        21.05296    18.25826    0  80 
Regional Job crush ratio
###      6276    9.80    5.54    3.20           44 
Baden-Württemberg
D            6276    .1383047    .345247    0  1
                    
Socio-economic control variables 
Age           6276       37.25032     9.338553    17  55 
Number of children in household
D      6276        .7123964     .9338158    0            6     
Youngest child in household age 0-1
D        6276        .0495539     .2170387    0            1 
Youngest child in household age 2-4 
D    6276        .1188655      .323656    0            1  
Youngest child in household age 5-7 
D     6276        .0876354     .2827865    0            1        
Youngest child in household age 8-10 
D        6276        .0768005     .2662959    0            1     
Youngest child in household age 11-18 
D       6276        .1826004     .3863693            0            1   
Health deficiency
 D          6276        .0581581     .2340607    0  1  
Help requiring person in household
 D       6276        .0226259     .1487194    0            1   
Married/ cohabiting with partner 
D    6276       .6011791     .4896948    0            1 
Monthly net  non-wage household income  
per capita, per 100 €        6276        2.966601      3.85996            0        51.75 
Monthly net  labor income of partner 
per capita, per 100 €        6276        4.641409     4.523627            0      43.46 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
i as far as not indicated differently, results refer to Employment sample; 
ii results refer to Wage sample;   not applicable ; 
Data Source: GSOEP (West) 1984-2005, own calculations; see text for sample selection information.   
 
The average log of hourly wages including fringe benefits corresponds to an average hourly 
wage rate of 12.74 €, with a standard deviation of 1.55 € and minimum (maximum) wages of 
1.21 € (80.45 €). Without fringe benefits, the average wage rate amounts to 11.95 € with a 
standard deviation of 1.51 € and minimum (maximum) wages of 1.12 € (71.27 €).  
Table 2 outlines regression results. Because of nonlinear relationships between the observa-
tion of being employed and the explaining variables of the employment equation, the strength 
of effects is indicated by marginal effects instead of regression coefficients.
18  
                                                 
18 The Marginal effect of the explaining variable j, δPr(y = 1|x) / δxj, illustrates the impact of an infinitesimal 
variation (metric variables) respectively of a switch from value “0” to value “1” (dummy variables) on employ-




Table 2: Regression results 
           
  Wage equation    Employment equation 
Explained variable:      Real gross hourly      Employment  
          wage rate with       status
i 
          proportional  
          fringe benefits (log) 
Explaining variable (in years, if not  GLS  Random Effects    Maximum Likelihood 
labeled as 
D=Dummy or otherwise;         
references: see Table 1)      Coefficient
+  Std. dev.
   Marginal effect
  Std. dev. 
                  (dF/dx)
+ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________                  
Schooling and Vocational Training 
Low level of schooling
D      -0.089    (0.028)***  -.0161146     (.0187383) 
Higher education entrance qualification
D    0.121    (0.033)***  -.1324789    (.0222846) 
No vocational degree
D          -0.062    (0.034)*   -.1786794     (.0200796) 
University degree
D            0.163    (0.043)***  .1722132   (.0265177) 
   
Professional Experience 
Tenure                  .0487871     (.0024544) 
Current fulltime            0.028    (0.006)***   
Current fulltime squared/100        -0.046    (0.000)* 
Current non-stop fulltime      0.015    (0.007)** 
Current non-stop fulltime squared/100        -0.048    (0.000) 
Former fulltime before time-out       0.008    (0.002)*** 
Former fulltime before part-time      0.016    (0.003)*** 
Current  part-time             -0.003    (0.003) 
Former part-time             0.010    (0.003)*** 
Time-out (current or former type)            -.0234816     (.0017915) 
Current time-out              -0.047    (0.016)*** 
Current time-out squared          0.002    (0.001)** 
Current birth-related time-out            -0.076    (0.038)** 
Current birth-related time-out squared   0.018    (0.006)*** 
Former time-out              -0.004    (0.003) 
Unemployment (current or former type)          -.0397241  (.0065424) 
Current (registered) unemployment         -0.045    (0.024)* 
Former (registered) unemployment         -0.016    (0.012) 
 
Workplace and work setting related control variables 
Agriculture and forestry
D        -0.108    (0.098) 
Mining and energy
D      0.054    (0.096) 
Construction
D        -0.064    (0.055) 
Trade
D          -0.127    (0.028)*** 
Transportation
D                      -0.108    (0.055)** 
Banking, insurance, other private services
D   -0.021    (0.025) 
Civil Service
D                  0.053    (0.021)** 
Occupational prestige
#       0.002    (0.000)*** 
Civil servant
D              0.121    (0.047)** 
White collar worker
D               0.149    (0.023)*** 
Firmsize 20-199 employees
D             0.110    (0.023)*** 
Firmsize 200-1999 employees
D                 0.172    (0.028)*** 
Firmsize 2000 minimum
D      0.186    (0.028)*** 
Weekly working hours
##        -0.014    (0.001)*** 
Regional Job crush ratio
###    0.002    (0.01)    -.0027708  (.0014834) 
Baden-Württemberg                    -.0543233     (.0227468) 
 
Socio-economic control variables 






Table 2 (contd.): Regression results 
 
Explained variable:      Real gross hourly      Employment  
          wage rate with       status
i 
          proportional  
          fringe benefits (log) 
Explaining variable (in years, if not  GLS  Random Effects    Maximum Likelihood 
labeled as D=Dummy or otherwise;          
references: see Table 1)      Coefficient
+  Std. dev.
   Marginal effect
  Std. dev. 
                  (dF/dx)
+ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________                  
Number of children in household
D                 -.0442861     (.0148191) 
Youngest child in household age 0-1
D                  -.4916809    (.023042)   
Youngest child in household age 2-4
 D                 -.3135247     (.0306148) 
Youngest child in household age 5-7
 D                 -.135933   (.0375388)   
Youngest child in household age 8-10
 D                -.1042524      (.038032) 
Youngest child in household age 11-18
 D              -.0721226    (.0236426)  
Health deficiency
 D                  -.155613     (.0354777) 
Help requiring person in household
 D               -.0910423      (.056389) 
Married/ cohabiting with partner 
D           -.0524218     (.0228794) 
Monthly net non-wage household income 
per capita, per 100 €               -.0636424     (.0048433) 
Monthly net non-wage household income,           .0017055      (.000257) 
per capita, per 100 €, squared                    
Monthly net labor income of partner          -.0273282     (.0043205) 
per capita, per 100 €                      
Monthly net labor income of partner          .0009201     (.0002168) 
per capita, per 100 €, squared                   
Select               0.042    (0.013)*** 
Constant                2.390    (0.055)***  Coeff.:  0.490  (0.122)*** 
 
Number of observations        3255        6276 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  +Standard deviations in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 




###unemployed persons per vacant job; Data Source: GSOEP (West) 1984-2005, own calculations. 
 
Test statistics of wage equation estimation: 
R
2 within/between/overall = 0.1394/0.3755/0.3582   
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian 
corr (u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)  
Wald chi
2 (35) = 982.97; Prob > chi
2 = 0.0000 
LM Test statistics (H0: Var(u) = 0): chi
2(1) = 990.29; Prob > chi
2 = 0.0000 
Hausman Test statistics (H0: difference in coefficients not systematic): chi
2 (31) = 217.05; Prob > chi
2 = 0.0000   
                    
Test statistics of employment equation estimation: 
Pseudo R
2 (Mc Fadden, 1973)
 = 0.3424   
Log likelihood
 = -2857.8323(0 failures and 1 success completely determined) 
Wald-Test (chi
2-distributed LR-Value, number of explaining variables in brackets): LR chi
2(23) = 2975.84; Prob > chi
2 = 0.0000 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Holding a university degree not only ameliorates employment propensities but also yields 
considerable remuneration in terms of a roughly 16% wage supplement, compared to a me-
dium vocational degree. The parameters of domestic context variables of the employment 
equation exhibit the expected shape: Determinants which promote reservation wages restrict 
the likelihood of employment. As to job biography, the estimates reveal a certain path depen-
dency of occupation and inoccupation, respectively: Former unemployment promotes actual 
unemployment and vice versa. With respect to professional experience, all variables refer to 




cumulated  human  capital.
19  For instance, the  job  market awards  full-time  employment  in 
terms of a 2.8% wage premium and even of a 4.3% supplement (2.8+1.5) in case of non-stop 
activity since employment entrance, both with respect to the first year . The wage premium 
diminishes as time goes by  since former human capital depreciates. Part -time jobs do not 
render significant wage growth, probably because of scarce promotion and training opportuni-
ties of part-time workers. Employment breaks – particularly if they are birth-motivated – in-
duce wage cuts at the time of reentry that amount to 12.3 percent at the maximum for the first 
time-out year (however, the penalty decreases with increasing time-out duration).
20,21 Birth 
related time-out is defined as occurring up to ten years after birth.    
 
3.3  Results on simulated wage losses  
 
Wage simulations are supposed to illustrate the wage loss related to a distinct hypothetical 
employment profile. For this purpose, several intermittent employment patterns have been 
constructed, differing in timing and duration of time-out (and succeeding part-time) interval, 
anyway deviating from the continuous full-time employment pattern identifying the reference 
woman. In detail, a tri-annual time-out spell followed by a tri-annual part-time span is named 
„Primary School pattern‟, since the mother reduces full-time employment until primary school 
enrolment of her child. A second pattern labeled „Kindergarten pattern‟ denotes a one-year 
time-out succeeding birth, combined with a two-years part-time employment thereafter. The 
labor market intermittency (due to first birth) starts at 28, 32 or 36 years of mother‟s age, re-
spectively. Furthermore, three different types of education are composed in order to calculate 
wage deductions in comparison to equally educated women (with/ without vocational degree, 
university degree). As to the remaining attributes (e. g. industry, firm size or select variable) I 
deployed education-specific averages.
22 The simulations abstract from the disturbance term 
and depict an ideal-typical wage profile that grounds on the estimated regression coefficients. 
The wage loss is calculated both in terms of an hourly wage gap and in terms of an aggregate 
wage sum lost. Both the hourly wage gap and the total of lost wages refer to the age of  45. 
This arises from the frequencies of biographic events in the underlying sample  restricting the 
extrapolation of regression results. On the assumption that the rate of real wage growth (the 
study refrained from) equals the discount rate the transformation of losses into their present 
values is dispensable. Figure 3 illustrates potential hourly wages as they occur in case of non-
stop full-time employment (reference wages). 
                                                 
19 For example, if the preceding year has been the first year of a full-time spell, it is designated as a current full-
time year; by contrast, if the full-time spell ended in the last year‟s preceding year, that year belongs to former 
full-time employment, whereas the last year is designated as current part-time, time-out or registered joblessness, 
respectively (to each year one single employment status has been assigned, depending on reported monthly sta-
tus frequencies). 
20 The wage penalties of joblessness resemble those of an elsewhere (not birth-) motivated time-out, but they are 
longer-staying. Indeed, the joblessness parameters are not statistically significant.  
21 To shorten analysis, I refrain from outlining the parameters of workplace related variables, most of whom are 
highly significant. 
22 As aforementioned, since academics are under-represented amongst employment sample mothers, this leads to 
an overestimation of their postnatal re-employment propensities, by the way underestimating the resulting wage 










































Gross Hourly Wage Rates of Reference and Outage Woman aged 45, 
Subject to Education, Timing and Duration of Withdrawal
Outage Woman (First Birth aged 
28/ 32/ 36), Primary School 
Pattern
Outage Woman (First Birth aged 
28/ 32/ 36), Kindergarten 
Pattern
Equally educated Reference 
Woman (Non-stop Full-time 
Employment)
Primary School Pattern: 3-years out-of-labor-force spell, followed by a 3 years part-time spell;
Kindergarten Pattern: 1-year out-of-labor-force spell, followed by a 2 years part-time spell;
Education: Low = no educational degree/ compulsory school plus no vocational degree 
(labor market entrance aged 19); 
Medium= Intermediate secondary school plus apprenticeship (labour market entrance aged 22); 
High= Matriculation standard plus university degree (labor market entrance aged 27); 
Job characteristics: Banking/ Insurance/ other private services, white collar worker, 
firm size 20-199 employees; 
Simulations based on regression results as shown in table 2;




As it can be seen from figure 3, wages in case of intermittent employment are depicted as 
being considerably lower than reference wages.  
First, the wage gap rises with increasing educational level. As in the very first years of profes-
sional career, investments in human capital are high and since academics enter labor market 
late, academic mothers‟ opportunity costs of childbirth are particularly high during that time – 
consisting to a large extent of omitted returns of forgone investments. On the other hand, ac-
cording to their late labor market entrance and their comparatively high basic wage rate, aca-
demic mothers refraining from market work suffer merely modest human capital depreciation. 
As to low educated women, they start their professional career early in life so that at the time 
of employment break a vast amount of job-related human capital that has been generated in 
the meantime is subject to negotiation.  
Second, the hourly wage loss is the higher the longer the time-out lasts. Although German 
institutional care arrangements actually ameliorate, even the return to full-time employment 
when the child reaches school age (Primary School pattern) has to be judged quite ambitious-
ly. The duration-related loss spread reveals considerable scope of action for political agents.  
Third, hourly wage gaps rise with increasing age of first birth. Although the spread per time 
unit decreases over time as wage growth decelerates, the shortening time span to catch up 
reference wages works in the opposite direction and outweighs the first mentioned effect. This 
holds for both patterns and all educational levels. 
As forthcoming figure 4 illustrates, not only hourly but also aggregate losses decrease when 
withdrawal spells are compressed (from Primary School to Kindergarten Pattern).  
The annualized wage losses have been aggregated to an overall lost wage sum from the time 
of withdrawal up to the age of 45. It is referred to as the „care bill‟ since it equals the total of 
lost (gross) earnings due to child care. The care bill splits into three components – lost earn-
ings during the out-of-labor-force time spell itself, losses during the succeeding part-time in-
terval and, last but not least, losses during the rebound phase that covers the time span from 
the outage woman‟s reentry into full-time employment up to the age of 45. However, medium 
educated women who get their first child at the age of 28 or 32 realize a higher wage loss than 
academics. In comparison to the latter, medium educated women‟s disadvantages in formal 
qualification are nearly offset by their professional experience advantage, due to their earlier 
labor market entrance. Hence, the wage level of medium educated non-stop employed women 
comes very close to that of the academic reference group. Though, returning from a family 
break, the cut of wages turns out to be sharper related to medium than to highly educated 
women, with higher losses as a consequence. At the age of 36, preceded deceleration of me-
dium qualified women‟s‟ wage growth accounts for comparatively lower wage losses with 
respect to academic women.  
Furthermore, the mentioned loss components are differently responsive to a variation of birth 
timing: While direct losses during time-outs and during succeeding part-time spells increase 
by postponing of first birth, the loss after returning to full-time up to the age of 45 – hereafter 
referred to as consequential costs – decreases. As a result, the overall wage loss decreases 
with increasing age at first birth – with the single exception of motherhood transition from the 
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Figure 4: 
Gross Wage Sum Lost By the Outage Woman up to Age 45, 
Dependent on Education and Age at First Birth*, 
Split into OLF-, Part-Time and Subsequent Losses
Kindergarten Pattern, Loss during Out-of-Labor-Force (OLF) Spell
Kindergarten Pattern, Loss during Part-Time Spell
Kindergarten Pattern, Loss after Return to Full-Time Up to Age 45 (Subsequent Loss)
Primary School Pattern, Loss during Out-of-Labor-Force (OLF) Spell
Primary School Pattern, Loss during Part-Time Spell
Primary School Pattern, Loss after Return to Full-Time Up to Age 45 (Subsequent Loss)
Note: Potential wage sum per educational level and first birth aged 28/ 32/ 36: 
Low: 450,651 €/ 359,113 €/ 260,393 €;
Medium: 528,064 €/ 425,116 €/ 311,569 €;
High: 528,395 € / 432,366 €/ 322,408 €;
Employment patterns, education and age of first birth: see diagram 3; 




4  Wage losses as a specialization risk in the bargaining context 
 
This section addresses the question to what extent the calculated wage losses may be consi-
dered as a specialization risk in the context of the aforementioned model of Ott (1992). The 
simple message of the Ott-model is the following one: Anticipated asymmetric specialization 
risks cause female labor supply to increase and birth inclination to decrease. On first sight, the 
model thereby simultaneously explains two common phenomena: high employment rates of 
mothers and a declining number of births. On second sight, some extensions of the model are 
necessary in order to fit the message of the model.  
In the Ott-framework, the specialization risk has been conceptualized as an intrapersonal loss 
of utility that arises from a loss in income between periods 1 and 2. As a consequence, with 
the underlying catching-up of wages in the Kindergarten pattern, the disadvantage of speciali-
zation covers only half a dozen of years, particularly if women get their children early. Fur-
thermore, in the logic of the model, it turns out that academics who in most cases offset fore-
gone income faster than less educated women have the comparatively highest disposition to 
specialize. This  contradicts  empirical  findings.  Therefore, departing  from  risk-conceptions 
that exclusively rely on past earnings, this paper focuses on the total of implicit costs as the 
conductive benchmark. Thus, deviating from the Ott-model, not formerly realized but poten-
tial education-specific wages at each point in time define the upper boundary of the speciali-
zation risk in question. To define potential wages, simulated non-stop full-time earnings of 
equally educated women are deployed. Thereby specialization risks are not simply restricted 
to human capital depreciation but also comprise foregone investments as a notable component 
of implicit child costs. As a consequence of the assumption that earnings of outage and refer-
ence women coincide before birth, the birth related specialization risk outlasts the recovery of 
former wages and persists as long as there is an income spread relating to reference wages. To 
this end, the applied risk concept of potential wages allows to immanently illustrating utility 
losses even in the context of intrapersonal cross-period income balancing. The magnitude of 
existing wage gaps at age 45 gives rise to the assumption that by enlarging the time horizon 
until retirement the upward trend of wage losses will continue, the more so as foregone old-
age pensions due to omitted pension scheme contributions furthermore deteriorate women‟s 
prosperity prospects.   
Another crucial point of the Ott-model relates to the male conflict payment: The assumption 
that it remains unchanged contradicts the fact that the partner who specializes on market em-
ployment benefits from a steadily expanding income potential – and thus, threat point – over 
his life course. Allowing the male conflict payment to increase over time ensures modeling 
persisting gender asymmetries in income potential distribution and a stronger bargaining posi-
tion of the market-specialized partner even if the female partner succeeded in surmounting her 
former exit wage rate.  
In the two-period Ott-model, specialization risks become virulent in phase 2. In this phase, 
around her 45
th birthday, the woman usually steps out of her fecundity window. Thus far per-
sisting wage losses have to be considered as being irreversible to a large extent. As the wom-
an already returned to full-time work, the short-run earnings range has been exhausted. At the 




course of child aging. In times like these, financial support by the domestic partner is at risk to 
break off because of his diminishing incentives to maintain the domestic deal. To sum up, 
persisting gross hourly wage differentials at the age of 45 may be accounted as a specializa-
tion risk in the narrow sense. In some more comprehensive view, the entire postnatal period, 
but at least the time after returning to full-time work, may be considered as a specialization 
risk, if one thinks of the fact that with her reentry decision the mother sets a signal for the 
substitutability of her support services. So the consequential costs may be seen as a specializa-
tion risk in a broader sense. 
As aforementioned, mother‟s education as well as timing and duration of the birth-related 
employment break affect the magnitude of computed losses differently. As hourly wage diffe-
rentials as well as consequential costs are higher in case of Primary School pattern compared 
to Kindergarten pattern, the willingness to specialize – in terms of venturing motherhood – is 
likely to increase with ameliorating institutional care that enables women to take short leaves. 
Concerning the timing of withdrawal, results are ambiguous: The hourly wage loss is the 
higher the later in life first birth occurs. On the contrary, consequential costs decrease with 
postponing, so an incentive to postpone contrasts a disincentive to do so. How to interpret 
these  contradictory  results?  The  cost-minimizing  timing  decision  relates  to  the  question, 
which stage of life is regarded as „stability-crucial‟ from the individual‟s point of view. If 
dissolution is to be expected at the end of fecundity span, both domestic partners have to bear 
income losses occurring by then. As the hourly wage gap at the time of labor market reentry is 
minimized with an early birth, in this case bringing first birth forward appears to be target-
aimed. Otherwise, if instability of marriage is to be assumed sooner, the woman is at risk to 
bear the whole burden of total losses herself; in this scenario, a postponing of first birth would 
be a rational strategy.   
As to the educational level, the hourly wage gap increases with increasing schooling and 
training degree. From this perspective, academic women face the highest specialization risks. 
This point is aggravated by the fact that, since academic women are frequently married to 
academics, the prenatal domestic distribution of labor income is quite balanced, so the distri-
bution shift is particularly hurting. With regard to consequential costs, the medium educated 
women bears the highest burden if first birth takes place at age 28, afterwards she changes 
place with the academic. Since German average age of first motherhood actually amounts to 
roughly 30 years, the academic realizes the highest specialization risk even with respect to 
consequential costs. 
Finally, the herein discussed specialization risk solely refers to realized reduced conflict pay-
ments at the time of dissolution (  in diagram 2); the paper refrains from coping with the 
shadows  this  (anticipated)  event  casts  on  intra-marriage  distribution  of  commodities.  Of 
course, the more pronounced the decrease in conflict payments the more strongly the deteri-
oration of intra-marriage bargaining power turns out to be. 
   
 




5  Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that after childbirth, meanwhile parents enjoy child related income facili-
ties,  women  should be capacity- rather than cash  oriented, for the sake of circumventing 
shortages of their medium-term income prospects. The latter harshly comes round at the mo-
ment the mother attempts to turn back to the labor market, when immense wage losses in the 
context of first motherhood become obvious. At the age of 45, the gross hourly wage gap of 
the outage woman amounts to 4.21 €, roughly one third of the sampled average gross hourly 
wage rate with fringe benefits (12.74 €); this holds, if an academic woman chooses to take a 
tri-annual time-out after first birth at the age of 36, succeeded by a tri-annual part-time spell. 
Furthermore, the overall sum of lost wages up to age 45 amounts to 181,465.50 €; this ap-
proximates 34 percent of the gross wage bill  West German academic women earn in the 
course of their professional career until the age of 45. As the regression results and subse-
quent simulations illustrate, losses increase with rising educational degree as well as with in-
creasing duration of employment interruption. As to the timing of first birth, the hourly wage 
gap stimulates births early in life, whereas from the perspective of subsequent costs (as a 
component of the overall lost wage sum) postponing is profitable; optimal timing depends on 
the individually assumed date of risk-turnaround in marriage.   
The findings of the study provide evidence of observable fertility behavior, especially in the 
Western part of Germany where reconcilability of family concerns and professional career is 
still in its infancy, concerning the below three and the above six years old children. Beyond 
this, the results explain why German mothers try to ‚keep the foot in the labor market‟s door„. 
Women may decide upon or against a child; however, in the first mentioned case, since pat-
terns of employment disruption depend on local institutional settings and working time con-
straints on the part of employers, the range of options is restrained to timing decisions. The 
study gives evidence of rationality of late parenthood, particularly with respect to academics. 
If one keeps in mind that wages reflect (marginal) productivity, a reduction of asymmetric 
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